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INTRODUCTION

September 15, 2008, is a date when the impossible became possible:
Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest United States investment bank at the time,
filed for bankruptcy.' The 158-year-old firm drew their curtains shut and became

I

ROSALIND Z. WIGGINS ET AL., YALE SCH. MGMT., THE LEHMAN BROTHERS BANKRUPTCY

(2014),
2
OVERVIEW
LehmanBrothers-A-REVA.pdf.

A:

http://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/001-2014-3A-V 1-
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the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States history. 2 The collapse of
Lehman Brothers was unprecedented, as many thought the investment bank was
"too big to fail." 3 One of the main causes of Lehman Brothers' demise was its
exposure to real estate and subprime mortgages; however, Lehman Brothers was
not the only entity hurt by the subprime market craze.4
The Great Recession of 2008 struck a heavy hand to many investors,
families, and businesses. The crisis began long before the downfall in 2008.' In
late 2001, the Federal Reserve dropped interest rates to new lows in order to
restore a fragile economy caused by the bursting of the dotcom bubble,6 high oil
prices, and the terrorist attacks of September I. The low interest rates created
a boom in the market, dramatically increasing the number of borrowers that were
willing to accept the new interest rates.8 These borrowers created a large demand
for real estate, increasing the price dramatically.9 Due to these conditions, many
individuals treated homes as an asset to be bought and sold in order to make
money. 10 These owners were not committed to the idea of continuing payments
on their mortgage when the housing market tumbled. 1 Some individuals simply
could not keep up with their payments. 12 Furthermore, the Federal Reserve's
decision to lower interest rates had a profound effect on bond investors who,
seeking a higher return, looked at AAA mortgage-backed-securities as more
13
attractive than real estate investments.
To remain competitive as a lender in the increasingly competitive
housing industry, the credit standards for lenders declined.14 Thus, many
investment and commercial banks entered into the subprime mortgage markets
to have an edge against others. In 2000, a subprime borrower had a FICO credit

2

Id.

3

Id.
See id
See generally MARK T.

4

5
WILLIAMS, UNCONTROLLED RISK: THE LESSONS OF LEHMAN
BROTHERS AND How SYSTEMIC RISK CAN STILL BRING DOWN TRE WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM

(2010) [hereinafter UNCONTROLLED RISK].
6
The "dotcom bubble" is a reference to the building up of new businesses online that led to
uncontrolled investment growth. This growth resulted in a steep market decline in March of 2000.
See Ben Geier, What Did We Learnfrom the Dotcom Stock Bubble of 2000?, TIME (Mar. 12,2015),
http://time.com/3741681/2000-dotcom-stock-bust/.
7
See UNCONTROLLED RISK, supra note 5, at 118.
8
Id.
9
10

I

Id.
Id.

13

Id.
See generally id.
Id. at 119.

14

Id.

12
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score of 660 or less, and, by 2005, many lenders had dropped that score to 620.15
From 2004 to 2006, subprime mortgage rates rose from 8% to approximately
20%. 16 Trouble began to appear in late 2006, when default rates on subprime and
even prime mortgages began to increase dramatically. " One of the main factors
leading to this was the sharp decline in housing prices in mid-2006, which drove
8
interest rates back up and made refinancing more difficult.' Mortgages
continued a downward spiral and, by August 2008, 9.2% of U.S. mortgages were
either delinquent or in foreclosure. 9 This number rose to 14.4% by September
2009.20

The collapse of the housing market and subsequent defaults by
borrowers had a spillover effect in other areas of finance. The Dow Jones
Industrial Average ("DJIA") peaked at an all-time high for the period on October
9, 2007, with an adjusted closing price of $14,164.53.21 From this peak, the DJIA
started its rapid decline, losing over 54% of its value by March 9, 2009, with an
adjusted closing price of $6,547.05.22 However, from this low, the market began
to recover from the financial crisis. The Wall Street Journal reported that the
Dow Jones had risen 21% in 13 days after the early March low. 23 Even though
the markets were recovering, many individuals demanded a change in the
regulatory structure of the financial markets to ensure that future recessions
would never be as serious. From these discussions, Congress passed and the
President signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act in 2010.24 Many economists and news organizations hailed the Act as the

15

Id. at 124.

16

DEP'T. OF STATISTICS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH, THE UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL,

CRISIS],
[hereinafter
(2008)
1
CRISIS
MORTGAGE
SUBPRIME
http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/fys/2012/Subprime%20mortgage%20crisis.pdf.
17
Gene Amromin & Anna L. Paulson, Default Rates on Prime and Subprime Mortgages:

(2010),
1
1,
VIEWS
&
NEWS
PROFITWISE:
Similarities,
and
Differences
2
010/pnvhttps://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/profitwise-news-and-views/
aug2010-reed-final-web-pdfpdf.
See CRISIS, supra note 16, at 2; see also JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.,
18
HARVARD

UNIV.,

THE

STATE

OF

THE

NATION'S

HOUSING

2008

1

(2008),

http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2008.pdf.
See CRISIS, supra note 16, at 4.
19
20

Id.

21

Dow

Jones

Industrial

Average:

Historical

Data,

YAHOO!

https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EDJI/history?period 1 1191816000&period2
interval=ld&filter-history&frequency= Id (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).

=

FYN.,

1236571200&

22

Id.

23

E. S. Browning, Bears Are Wary as Bull Returns, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2009, 12:01 AM),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 123811041706752903.
24
Jesse Lee, President Obama Signs Wall Street Reform: "No Easy Task", WHITE HOUSE,
(July 21, 2010, 2:22 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2010/07/21/presidentobama-signs-wall-street-reform-no-easy-task.
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"biggest overhaul of U.S. financial regulation since the 1930s ....
,,2'
However,
some have since proposed rolling back the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
This Note argues that Congress should be wary of rolling back the DoddFrank Act of 2010 and should instead seek to improve the Act by altering parts
of existing language and implementing new sections to cure deficiencies. Rolling
back the Dodd-Frank Act could lead to excessive risk-taking in markets by banks
and investors. Part II of this Note discusses the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and the
effects of the legislation seven years after its enactment. Furthermore, this Note
analyzes current attempts by Congress to rollback certain provisions of the DoddFrank Act and the effect that economists believe these rollbacks may have on the
future of the markets. Part HI argues that, instead of rolling back major parts of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which is a short-sighted approach to fixing the deficiencies
within the current Act, alterations can be made to current Dodd-Frank Act
language. Part Ill contains proposed language not mentioned in the Act to rectify
these deficiencies.
II.

BACKGROUND

The financial crisis of 2008 sent shockwaves through the financial
sectors of the United States. Calls by legislators and citizens to further regulate
actions by investors and banks were heard nationwide.2 6 These efforts led to
several regulatory reforms,27 including one this Note will analyze in depth: the
Dodd-Frank Act.
Since its inception in 2010, many have been unsure whether the
landmark financial regulation bill has accomplished all that it purported to do. 28
Some claim that the law has crushed small banks, restricted access to credit, and
caused more financial instability in the market. 29 Others argue that the DoddFrank Act has been a "stabilizing force" for the United States economy and that
any attempt to roll back the regulations would be catastrophic.3 °

25
Factbox:Highlights of U.S.Dodd-Frank Wall St Reform Bill, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2010, 12:26
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financial-regulation-siftna-doddfrank/factboxhighlights-of-u-s-dodd-frank-wall-st-reform-bill-idUSTRE6A73MR2O101108.
26
Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
27
See DARRELL DUFFIE, STAN. UNIV., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM AFTER THE CRisis: AN
ASSESSMENT,
(2016),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publicationpdf/rp3440_financialregulatory reform after the crisis.pdf.
28
See Jeb Hensarling, After Five Years, Dodd-Frankis a Failure,WALL ST.J. (July 19, 2015,
5:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-five-years-dodd-frank-is-a-failure-1437342607.
29

Id.

Andrew

Soergel, A Stabilizing Force, U.S. NEWS (July 21, 2015, 6:00 AM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/07/21/ask-an-economist-did-dodd-frankstabilize-the-financial-sector.
30
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The following sections further analyze the Dodd-Frank Act. Section ll.A
discusses the various provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the purpose(s)
behind each provision. Next, Section II.B examines new efforts by Congress to
look through the Act and overhaul or rollback certain provisions mentioned in
Section II.A.
A.

The Dodd-FrankAct of2010

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 was initially proposed by President Barack Obama in June 2009.31 The bill
was created as a response to the recession, which had led to a high unemployment
rate as well as losses and instability with banks, investors, and businesses. The
bill was later revised and named after then Financial Services Committee
Chairman, Barney Frank, and former Chairman of the Senate Banking
32
Committee, Chris Dodd, for their work on the bill. On July 21, 2010, the bill
33
officially became law.
On its face, the purpose of the law is to "promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American taxpayer by
ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes." 3 4 The law includes several provisions to curtail the
major drivers of the 2008 financial crisis. Some of these provisions include
changes to federal financial regulation and substantive requirements that apply
to a range of market participants. 5 The full Act includes more than 16 titles, and,
36
thus, is too large to fully evaluate and discuss in this Note. Therefore, this Note
will focus on three major provisions that are currently in debate for rollback or
alteration at the Congressional level: the Volcker Rule, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, and the Orderly Liquidation Authority of regulators.

31

President Barack Obama, Remarks of the President on Regulatory Reform (June 17, 2009),

https://Hobamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-regulatry-reform.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111 th Cong.
32
(2009-10), https://www.congress.gov/bill/11 th-congress/house-bill/04173#major%o20actions.
33

Id.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2012)).
35
David S. Huntington et al., Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation,
34

HARV.

L.

SCH. FORUM

ON CORP.

GOVERNANCE

AND FIN.

REGULATION

(July

7,

2010),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-regulationlegislation/#comments.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
36
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2012)).
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1. The Volcker Rule
The Volcker Rule is buried in the Dodd-Frank Act and is found in
Section 619.37 Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve Chairman for whom the
rule is named, states that the purpose of the rule is to keep banks from taking
excessive risks based on the implied notion of government support.38
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was amended to incorporate
the prohibitions included in the Volcker Rule.3 9 The Volcker Rule sought to end
excessive risk-taking by stopping banking entities from "(A) engag[ing] in
proprietary trading; or (B) acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or
other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity
fund."4 ° In more common terms, the Rule stops banks from engaging in risky
actions by "restricting certain types of trading activities." 41 Commissioner Kara
Stein, when explaining how the Rule sought to protect the market, stated that
"[t]he Volcker Rule seeks to limit those threats and the need for that type of a
rescue by restoring part of the firewall between commercial and investment
banking, redrawn in ways to reflect some of the more potent risks modem
markets pose. '"42 She went on to explain that the Rule was implemented to
encompass certain activities not covered by the Glass-Steagall Act and to
encourage the banks to focus on serving customers-not on making large
speculative bets.4 3
While the Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading' and ownership
interest in hedge funds or a private equity fund, the Rule does offer several

37

Id.
See Paul A. Volcker, Commentary on the Restrictions on ProprietaryTrading by Insured
Depositary
Institutions,
38

http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/VolckerRule

Essay_2-13-12.pdf (last visited

Aug. 23, 2018).

39
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2018)).
40
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2018).
41

MATTHEW RICHARDSON,

N.Y.U.

STERN SCH. OF Bus., WHY THE VOLCKER RULE

Is A USEFUL

TOOL FOR MANAGING SYSTEMIC RISK 3, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111316.pdf.
42
Commissioner Kara M. Stein, The Volcker Rule: Observations on Systemic Resiliency,
Competition, and Implementation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM'N

(Feb.

9, 2015),

https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/volcker-rule-observations-on-systemic-resiliencycompetition.html.
43

Id.

44
Proprietary trading occurs when financial institutions utilize customer money to lend again
and make profits. See Heather Stewart, What Is "ProprietaryTrading"?,THE GuARDiAN (Jan. 21,
2010, 2:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/jan/21/proprietary-trading-wallstreet-banks.
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exemptions to these prohibitions.4 5 For proprietary trading, the Rule provides
exemptions for underwriting, market making-related activities, isk-mitigating
hedging, trading in certain government obligations, certain trading activities of
46
foreign banking entities, and a few other permitted activities. The underwriting
exemption requires that "a banking entity act as an underwriter for a distribution
of securities (including both public and private offerings) and that the trading
47
The market
desk's underwriting position be related to that distribution."
ready to
stand
desk
trading
that
a
requires
exemption
activities
making-related
"purchase and sell one or more types of financial instruments."4 8 The trading in
certain government obligations exemptions permit banks to continue to engage
49
in proprietary trading with U.S. governmental obligations. Certain trading
activities of foreign banking entities are generally not prohibited under this rule
so long as the trading decisions and principal risks of the foreign banking entity
take place outside of the United States.5 ° Finally, trading on behalf of a customer
in a fiduciary capacity or in principal trades that are not with risk for an insurance
5
company for its general or separate account are generally allowed. "
For the covered funds prohibitions, hedge funds, and private equity
funds, the Volcker Rule offers several exemptions and exclusions. The
52
prohibition excludes entities with more general corporate purposes. Examples
of entities that fall under this category are wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint
ventures, acquisition vehicles, SEC-registered investment companies, and
business development companies.53 Other exclusions include the availability of
foreign funds offered abroad, loan securitizations, insurance company separate
accounts, small business investment companies, and public welfare
investments.5 4 The Rule also permits "a banking entity, subject to appropriate
conditions, to invest in or sponsor a covered fund in connection with: organizing
and offering the covered fund; underwriting or market making-related activities;
certain types of risk-mitigating hedging activities; activities that occur solely
55
outside of the United States and insurance company activities."
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2012)).
45

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINAL RULES TO
46
1,
RULE"
"VOLCKER
THE
IMPLEMENT
2

https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg
47

Id.

48

52

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.

53

Id.

54

Id.
Id.at 2-3.

49
50

S

55
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The Volcker Rule became effective on April 1, 2014.56 At that time, the
Federal Reserve Board extended the conformance until July 21, 2015." 7 The
Board hoped that this extra time would allow bank entities to conform to the
various rules implemented in Section 619. The final Volcker Rule requires all,
except the "less active" bank entities, to set forth a compliance program to ensure
that their respective entities remain in compliance with the various prohibitions
and exemptions provided for in the Volcker Rule.5 8 However, for our purposes,
we will not delve into the intricacies of the compliance procedures.
However, the Volcker Rule has not been implemented without stiff
opposition. Many claim that the Rule limits market-making activities through
which financial institutions use to assist their customers. 59 Furthermore, several
experts have indicated that the Rule will impede on 6a financial institution's
ability to manage a customer's risk by hedging positions. °Another problem with
the Rule arises under the interpretation of regulators between different
administrations. The Rule was constructed with an ability to allow it to be
construed broadly or narrowly.6 1 The Rule also requires62more information to be
disclosed by boards and directors of large organizations. This requirement puts
a large responsibility on upper-level management that may lead to
disorganization and difficulties. 63 Lastly, many worry that the large compliance
burden may negatively affect community banks. 6

56

Id. at 3.

57
58

Id.

60

Id.

See A USER'S GUIDE TO THE VOLCKER RULE, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 27 (2014) [hereinafter
USER'S GUIDE], http://www.iflr.com/pdfs/A-users-guide-to-the-Volcker-Rule.pdf.
59
The Volcker Rule's Impact on Financial Institutions and Companies, LEXISNEXIS,
https://www.lexisnexis.com/communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/20 14/
01/0 6 /the-volcker-rule-s-impact-on-financial-institutions-and-companies.aspx (last visited Sept. 6,
2018).
61

TheFinal VolckerRule: 10 Issuesfor Banks to Consider,WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2014,12:01
AM), http://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/25/the-final-voicker-rule- 10-issues-for-

banks-to-consider/.
62

Id.

63

Id.

64

See generally MARSHALL Lux

AND

FATE

OF

& ROBERT

GREENE, HARVARD KENNEDY ScH., THE STATE
BANKING
(2015),

COMMUNITY

https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/FinalState

andFateLuxG

reene.pdf.
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2.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer
65
Financial Protection (hereinafter "CFPB" or "the Bureau"). On the Bureau's
website, it states that its core function is to "provide a single point of
accountability for enforcing federal consumer financial laws and protecting
consumers in the financial marketplace." 66 The Bureau lists its core work as
rooting out unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices by writing rules,
supervising companies, and enforcing the law; enforcing laws that outlaw
discrimination in consumer finance; taking consumer complaints; enhancing
financial education; researching the consumer experience of using financial
67
products; and monitoring financial markets for new risks to consumers. The
Bureau was first proposed in 2007 by Professor Elizabeth Warren, who was
began
working at Harvard University at the time.68 The Bureau 6 formally
9
operations on July 21, 2011, with Richard Cordray at the helm.
The White House under President Barack Obama released a page
7°
detailing the various uses for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
President Obama contended that the Bureau was needed to consolidate the
71
already existing regulatory structure and to focus on consumers. The page
stated that, "for the first time, the Federal government w[ould] be able to regulate
the activities of independent payday lenders, private mortgage lenders and
servicers, debt collectors, credit reporting agencies, and private student loan
companies. '72 The availability of these regulations, President Obama argued,
73
would allow for greater consumer protection across the financial markets.
Furthermore, the President argued that the Bureau had sufficient tools in its
74
arsenal to protect individuals and their money. The President stated that the
Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq. (2012)).
The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about66
65

us/the-bureau/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
67

Id.

68

See generally Elizabeth Warren,

Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007),

http://democracyj oumal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/.
Binyamin Applebaum, Former Ohio Attorney General to Head New Consumer Agency,
69
N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/business/former-ohio-attorneygeneral-picked-to-lead-consumer-agency.html? r0&pagewanted=all.
See generally Megan Slack, Consumer FinancialProtection Bureau 101: Why We Need a
70

Consumer

Watchdog,

WHITE

HOUSE:

BLOG

(Jan.

4,

2012,

11:13

AM),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau101 -why-we-need-consumer-watchdog.
71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.
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main duties of the Bureau fell into three broad categories.7 5 These categories are
to educate, enforce, and research.76 For education, the White House stated that
the "CFPB provides financial education to consumers and ensures people are
able to get the information they need to make sound financial decisions."7 7 The
President hoped that this information would help consumers with a more
transparent financial system for non-banking entities.7 8 Under enforcement, the
President stated that the Bureau "is responsible for rule-making, supervision, and
enforcement of Federal consumer financial protection laws and restricting unfair,
deceptive, or abusive acts or practices against consumers."79 Thus, the Bureau
would have the ability to punish and fine those that hurt consumers directly.8"
Finally, the White House stated that the Bureau had the duties to research by
analyzing how people respond and interact with financial institutions and viceversa. 81
The Bureau has been able to accomplish a variety of goals since its
inception. To start, the Bureau successfully set new standards for the mortgage
market.82 These standards require lenders to verify that borrowers have the
income necessary in order to repay loans.83 Furthermore, the standards have
discouraged lenders from having exotic mortgages that boasted introductory
"teaser" rates. " The Bureau has been using their enforcement power liberally. 85
As of the summer of 2016, the Bureau had obtained more than $11.7 billion in
relief for consumers.8 6 These payments went on to reimburse more than 27
million consumers who have been victims, according to the Bureau.87 The
Bureau also created a "shopping sheet" for use by students who seek financial
aid from the government.88 These sheets are meant to inform institutions and

75
76

77
78

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.

79

Id.
See generally The Dodd-FrankAct Reinforces and Expands SEC Enforcement Powers,
GIBSON DuNN (July 21, 2010), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-dodd-frank-act-reinforces-andexpands-sec-enforcement-powers/.
80

81

Id.

Ian Salisbury, The CFPBTurns 5 Today. Here's What It's Done (and What it Hasn't),TIME:
MONEY
(July
21,
2016),
http://time.com/money/4412754/cfpb-5-year-anniversaryaccomplishments/; see also Slack, supra note 70.
83
See Salisbury, supranote 82; see also Slack, supra note 70.
84
See Salisbury, supra note 82; see also Slack, supra note 70.
82

85

See Salisbury, supra note 82.

86

Id.

87

Id.

88

See Slack, supra note 70.
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89
schools on how to better inform prospective students on the costs of college.

Lastly, the Bureau instituted new card agreements for consumers who seek credit
cards in order to90allow them to better digest the information given to them at the
time of signing.
Since the Bureau's inception, it has been rife with legal challenges and
controversy. Two main lawsuits were filed in the early years of the Bureau. The
first of these law suits was filed on June 21, 2012, and argued that the Bureau is
an "Unconstitutional Power-Grab."'" The Complaint further alleged that using a
recess appointment to appoint the Bureau's Director was beyond the President's
power and is unconstitutional.92 One year later, the judge dismissed the
93

Complaint finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the proceeding.
However, in the summer of 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that the bank in the suit did have standing to
challenge the Bureau but that the states mentioned in the complaint did not have
standing to bring the suit. 94 After the case was remanded to the lower court, the
District Court granted and denied summary judgment in part. 95 The district court
judge wrote that the plaintiffs assertion that the Director did not have the
authority to ratify his actions prior to his official confirmation were not
persuasive.96

On July 22, 2013, another complaint was filed by a private law firm
challenging the Bureau's constitutionality. 97 This complaint by Kimberly A.
Pisinski and Morgan Drexen, Inc. alleged that the Bureau's structure "insulates
it from political accountability and internal checks and balances in violation of
the United States Constitution." 98 However, later that October, the Court
dismissed the Complaint and never addressed the merits of the plaintiff's
constitutionality claim. 99

89

Id.

90

Id.
Christine

Hall,

Dodd-Frank Unconstitutional Power-Grab, Says New Lawsuit,
(June 21, 2012), https://cei.org/content/dodd-frank-unconstitutionalpower-grab-says-new-lawsuit.
State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132 (D.D.C. 2013).
92
91

COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.

93
94
95
96

Id. at 165.
State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
State Nat'l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 197 F. Supp. 3d 177, 186 (D.D.C. 2016).
Id. at 184-85.

Richard Pollock, Private Firm Sues CFPB, Challenges Board's Constitutionality, WASH.
(July 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/private-firm-sues-cfpb3 3 354
.
challenges-boards-constitutionality/article/25
98
Complaint at 1, Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 979 F. Supp. 2d 104
(D.D.C. 2013) (No. 13-CV-1112).
99
Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 979 F. Supp. 2d 104, 122 (D.D.C.
97

EXAM'R

2013).
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Requiring "for cause" removal of the Director has also been debated
among the courts since the Bureau's inception. In 2016, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard this argument.1 00 In PHH Corp. v.
ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau,the Court discussed the background and
the role of independent agencies in the Federal Government.10' The Court further
delved into the intricacies of the formation of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. 10 2 The Court explained that, originally, the Bureau, as explained by the
White House and Senator Warren, was to be made up of a multi-member board
or panel to ensure a balance and check on power.103 The Court summarized this
idea by stating:
[T]o help preserve individual liberty under Article II, the heads
of executive agencies are accountable to and checked by the
President, and the heads of independent agencies, although not
accountable to or checked by the President, are at least
accountable to and checked by their fellow commissioners or

board members.

104

However, after multiple reiterations in Congress, the Dodd-Frank Act
was passed with a provision stating that the Bureau was to be headed by a single
director and not a multi-member commission.0 5 Thus, as the Court stated, "the
Director enjoys more unilateral authority than any other officer in any of the
three branches of the U.S. Government, other than the President."' 1 6 After
evaluating the powers given to the Bureau, the Court decided to require the
agency to conform to Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), and become a position with "at will" removal by the President. 107 This
opinion made national headlines across the United States. 0 8
The following year, the same court granted the respondent's petition for
a rehearing en banc. 0 9 The Court asked the parties to answer three questions. 1 0
The first of these was, "Is the CFPB's structure as a single-Director independent
100
101

PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 12-15.

103

Id. at 15.
Id. at 7.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 39.

108

Stacy Cowley, Court Gives President More Power Over Consumer Agency Chief N.Y.

102

TIMES

(Oct.

11,

2016),

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/dealbook/consumer-

financial-protection-bureau-court-ruling-unconstitutional.html? r 1.
109
PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 16, 2017).
110
Id. at *5-6.
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agency consistent with Article II of the Constitution and, if not, is the proper
11
The second was, "May
remedy to sever the for-cause provision of the statute?"
the court appropriately avoid deciding that constitutional question given the
' 2
The last question the court
panel's ruling on the statutory issues in this case?"
wished for the parties to answer was, "If the en banc court, which has today
separately ordered en banc consideration of Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C.
Cir. 2016), concludes in that case that the administrative law judge who handled
that case was an inferior officer rather than an employee, what is the appropriate
disposition of this case?"" '3 These questions may form the foundation for further
legal analysis by other courts in the future.
Further controversy and opposition has arisen in committees in
Congress. The United States House Financial Services Committee ("the
Committee") published a press release criticizing the Bureau for its lack of
oversight and accountability. 4 The Subcommittee Chairman Patrick McHenry
asserted that, "[i]n the end, this single director can disregard advice and manage
as he wishes. He has little accountability to the Administration, and even less to
Congress; his budget is secure.""' 5 The Committee further condemned the
Bureau citing several specific problems. "6 Some of these included not following
the Office of Management and Budget guidelines, rules and regulations, not
participating in the Office of Personnel Management Employee Viewpoint
Survey, and spending a substantial amount of money on travel for its
employees. "7
The Bureau has also been under heavy scrutiny for its methodology in
identifying alleged acts of racial discrimination among auto lenders.' " The
Bureau, because of legal restraints, utilized a method of identifying applicants'
9
last names and addresses to "guess" the race of auto loan applicants." The
Bureau used this information to charge several lenders with discriminating
against minority applicants. 2 0 These charges led to a large amount of fines and
settlement fees paid to the Bureau."'2 However, as of late 2015, the Bureau had
ii

Id. at *6.

112

Id.

Id.
CFPBLacks Oversight andAccountability,U.S. HOUSE FIN. SERVS. COMM. (June 18, 2013),
https://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentprint.aspx?DocumentlD=339512.
115 Id.
113
114

116

Id.

Id.
Yuka Hayashi, Lawmakers Dispute Method to Identify Victims of Racial Bias in Auto
Lending, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2016, 7:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lawmakers-disputemethod-to-identify-victims-of-racial-bias-in-auto-lending- 1453248363.
119
Id.
120 Id.
117

118

121

Id.
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yet to compensate the individuals who were victims of the auto loan
discrimination, and the government still was not sure whether the individuals that
would be receiving payments were actual minorities. 122 The Bureau even
admitted in private documents that it knew the methodology was flawed and was
overestimating the number of minority applicants, but they continued to use the
method regardless. 123

3. Orderly Liquidation Authority for Regulators
Title 11 of the Dodd-Frank Act outlines the orderly liquidation authority
for regulators. 124 The purpose behind the provision is to allow for the quick and
orderly liquidation of large financial companies that are close to failing.125 The
provision allows the government to liquidate large organizations so that they do
not need to bailout businesses that subsequently file for bankruptcy after being
provided government funds. 126 Entities that are subject to the provisions
provided for in the authority are those classified as "financial companies." 127 The
provision lists four separate categories of financial companies that fall under the
128
reach of the Act.

Title II provides several provisions which outline the process by which
organizations in financial distress will be evaluated and liquidated. First, the
Secretary of the Treasury ("the Secretary") will determine if the company should
be placed in a receivership under Title 11.129 The Secretary utilizes a two-pronged
test to determine this. 130 First, the Secretary reviews the company and determines
whether it is in default or in danger of defaulting. 131Some contributing factors
in this analysis include whether the company is likely to file for bankruptcy, has
greater debts than assets, has incurred debts that will deplete most capital, or will

AnnaMaria Andriotis & Rachel Louise Ensign, U.S. Government Uses Race Test for $80
Million in Payments, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-uses-race-testto-decide-who-to-pay-in-ally-auto-loan-pact-1446111002.
123
Rachel Witkowski, CFPB Overestimates PotentialDiscrimination,Documents Show, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 17, 2015, 10:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-overestimates122

potential-discrimination-documents-show.
124 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381 et seq. (2012)).
125

Id.

126

Id.

127

MARK

A.

MCDERMOTT,

SKADDEN,

ORDERLY

LIQUIDATION

AUTHORITY

1,

https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSROrderly Liquidation Authority.pdf.
128

Id.

129

See 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2018).

130

Id.

131

Id.
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32
likely be able to not pay debts in the normal course of business.' Next, the
default.1 33
Secretary evaluates the systemic risk involved if the company were to
These risks include the effect of default on financial stability, lower income
communities, creditors, and shareholders. 134The Secretary will also examine the
likelihood of bankruptcy, private sector alternatives, and what future actions can
be taken to help the company. 13 If the Secretary completes this analysis and
believes that the company should be placed into receivership under the Federal
will take control of the
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the FDIC
31 6
company.
the
of
operations
and
liabilities,
assets,
As receiver of the company, the FDIC takes on the duties of the company
which has been placed under receivership. These duties include the transfer or
sale of assets, creating bridge financial organizations to help assume assets or
liabilities during liquidation, and approving or denying creditor's claims against
the company. "7 This liquidation process imposes heavy financial burdens on the
FDIC, however. Thus, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act also creates the Orderly
Liquidation Fund.'3 8 This fund is created by the U.S. Treasury to cover the
39
administrative costs of liquidation that the FDIC may incur during the process. '
As receiver, the FDIC may also invalidate prior agreements that hinder the ability
of it to carry out its duties. 4 ° If the financial company is a broker or dealer, not
only is the FDIC appointed receiver, the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation ("SIPC") is appointed as trustee to manage any assets that are not
transferred over to a bridge company by the FDIC. 141
Once the FDIC has been placed as the receiver for a financial company,
the claims process begins. Title II also provides the process for asserting claims
against the defaulting company and establishes a ladder to determine the priority
of payments made to creditors.142 The "ladder" for claims is set up as follows
with (1) administrative costs; (2) the government; (3) wages, salaries, or
commissions of employees; (4) contributions to employee benefit plans; (5) any
other general or senior liability of the company; (6) any junior obligation; (7)
salaries of executives and directors of the company; and (8) obligations to

132

See id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135
136

Id.
Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. § 5390.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id. § 5385.
Id. §§ 5389, 5390.

142
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shareholders, members, general partners, and other equity holders.143 The list
was constructed in this way to ensure that the executives, directors, and
shareholders bear the burden of the losses and failures of the company by being
the last in line to receive payments. " Further, the Act makes directors and
management personally liable for losses that occurred from their gross
negligence or bad conduct. 145 However, when the FDIC is working to conduct
the liquidation, the FDIC must take action not to preserve the company they have
been appointed receiver to but rather to preserve the financial stability of the
economy as a whole.14 6
Many argue that one of the most important provisions provided under
Title H of the Dodd-Frank Act is the ban of the use of taxpayer funds to preserve
a company into receivership under Title 11.147 Many of the controversies from the
2008 Financial Crisis was the use of taxpayer money to bail out many major
companies. Congress hoped that the implementation of this provision with the
liquidation authority granted to it would ensure that taxpayer funds would be
protected.
B. ProposedCongressionalChanges
For many years, Congress has discussed changing key provisions of the
landmark Dodd-Frank Act. However, recently, Congress has finally taken the
first actions to implement and modify provisions to the Dodd-Frank Act. 148
Congressional leaders claim that the Dodd-Frank Act encourages bailouts, and
they, instead, wish to pursue market discipline to enforce regulatory behavior. 149
Others claim that these "modifications" will strip the bill of its key provisions
that protect the United States economy from another crash. " One of the key
bills that was passed in the House of Representatives is the Financial CHOICE
Act of 2017.151

143

Id. § 5389.

144
Dodd-Frank:Title II- Orderly LiquidationAuthority, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank-titleII (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
145

Id.

146

Id.

Id.
H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
149
Jim Puzzanghera, House Votes Along Party Lines to Repeal Key Dodd-FrankFinancial
Reforms, L. A. TrMEs (Jun. 8, 2017, 2:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dodd-frankrepeal-20170608-story.html.
150
Bob Bryan, The House Quietly Voted to Destroy Post-Financial-Crisis Wall Street
Regulations, Bus. INSIDER (June 8, 2017, 4:56 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/house-voteon-financial-choice-act-wall-street-dodd-frank-regulation-2017-6.
151
H.R. 10, 116th Cong. (2017).
147

148
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The Financial Services Committee set up a website to view the Financial
2
CHOICE Act and its key provisions.I1 The Committee summarized the bill by
53
stating the following seven key principles: '
1. Taxpayer bailouts of financial institutions must end and no
company can remain too big to fail; 2. Both Wall Street and
Washington must be held accountable; 3. Simplicity must
replace complexity, because complexity can be gamed by the
well-connected and abused by the Washington powerful; 4.
Economic growth must be revitalized through competitive,
transparent, and innovative capital markets; 5. Every American,
regardless of their circumstances, must have the opportunity to
achieve financial independence; 6. Consumers must be
vigorously protected from fraud and deception as well as the loss
of economic liberty; and 7. Systemic risk must be managed in a
market with profit and loss. 154
The bill seeks to accomplish these principles in a variety of ways.
However, for purposes of this Note, I will focus on alterations to the three
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act above. The first provision that the bill seeks
to modify is Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, which outlines the Orderly
Liquidation Authority. The bill, as proposed, offers a "six-step plan to end
bailouts."'' 55 First, the bill seeks to repeal the Orderly Liquidation Authority in
its entirety.' 56 After repealing the Orderly Liquidation Authority, the bill wishes
to replace it with a new chapter to the federal Bankruptcy Code that could
57
accommodate the failure of large, complex financial institutions. 1 Next, the bill
seeks to impose new limitations on the Federal Reserve's emergency lending
authority. 58 The bill also wishes to prohibit the future use of the Exchange
59
Stabilization Fund to bail out a financial firm or creditors. 1 Fifth, the bill seeks
to repeal the FDIC's authority to establish a widely available program to

See generally The Financial CHOICE Act, HOUSE COMMITTEE
https://financialservices.house.gov/choice/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
152

153

SERVS.,

HOUSE COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY,

https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/financial-choice
.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2018).
154 Id.
155

ON FIN.

HOUSE COMM.

OPPORTUNITY

FOR

ON FIN. SERVS., THE FINANCIAL
INVESTORS,

CONSUMERS,
2

act executive-summary_final

CHOICE ACT: CREATING

AND

ENTREPRENEURS

HOPE AND

22

(2017),

https://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 0 17-0424 financial choice act of 2017comprehensivesummaryfinal.pdf.
Id.
156
157

Id.

158 Id.
159

Id.
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guarantee obligations of banks during times of severe economic crisis. 6' 0 Finally,
the bill repeals the authority in the Financial Stability Oversight Council to
designate certain financial organizations as "too big to fail."16' 1
The drafters of the Financial CHOICE Act expressed their worry that
62
taxpayers would be exposed to pay under the Orderly Liquidation Authority. 1
The drafters cited to the six largest United States banking organizations,
discussing that the FDIC could borrow potentially over $10 trillion to cover the
assets of these institutions.163 This large amount of exposure worried the drafters
who state that "taxpayers have received such promises from their government
before, only to find themselves holding the bag for billions of dollars in losses.
"164

Another key bill that is currently being discussed in the Senate is entitled
the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act
("Economic Act"). 165 The bill took the work the House had done in the Financial
CHOICE Act and attempted to make it more bipartisan to attain the votes
required. The Economic Act is much narrower in scope than the Financial
CHOICE Act. The Congressional Research Service ("CRS") published a report
that summarized the arguments for and in opposition to the bill. 166 The CRS
states that the general purpose of the bill is to "provide regulatory relief to banks,
relax mortgage lending rules, and provide additional consumer protections
related to credit reporting and other areas." 161 Supporters of the bill stated that it
would eliminate a number of burdensome regulations, foster economic growth,
and provide consumer protections. 168 Opponents of the bill argued that it would
needlessly eliminate provisions of Dodd-Frank to benefit large and profitable
banks. 169 The CRS categorized the provisions of the bill into five main
categories: (1) regulatory relief for "community" banks, (2) regulatory relief for
large banks, (3) amendments to mortgage lending regulations, (4) new consumer
protections in credit reporting, and (5) regulatory changes in capital markets.' 70

160
161
162
163

164

Id.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.at 25.

Id.at 24.

Jim Puzzanghera, Senate Committee Advances BipartisanMeasure Rolling Back Some Bank
Regulations, L. A. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2017, 2:35 PM), http://beta.latimes.com/business/la-fi-senatebanking-regulations-20171205-story.html.
166
David W. Perkins, FinancialRegulation: The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and
Consumer Protection Act
(S. 2155), CONG. RES. SERV. (May
14,
2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IN 10833.pdf.
167
Id.
165

168

Id.

169

Id.
Id.

170
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Proponents contend that the bill offered by the Senate would eliminate unduly
burdensome regulations, foster economic growth, and provide increased
" ' Opponents argue that the bill would needlessly limit
consumer protections. 17
72
Dodd-Frank protections in order to benefit large and profitable banks. 1
III.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that drastically overhauling the three sections of the
Dodd-Frank Act listed above would lead to another financial crisis and cause
more financial strain. Thus, smart economic regulatory policies need to be put in
place to alleviate the dangerous precedent of the past. These policies need to be
efficient and effective, to prevent an overburdening of the economy, while
providing for a satisfactory amount of regulatory oversight by the government.
Economic performance and growth is related to the performance of the
government in regulating the market effectively and efficiently. Too many
cumbersome regulations slow markets and make it difficult for smaller
businesses to compete.' 7 3 Too little regulation allows businesses to take
advantage of loopholes and cause economic bubbles, like the one that resulted in
the economic recession in 2008. ' Thus, a happy medium must be found to
ensure that businesses compete fairly and ethically, while also remaining
competitive in the global economy. 175
A largely regulated or unregulated economy leads to economic decline
and depression in the markets. 76 After periods of economic recession and
difficulties, governments tend to over-regulate businesses in the hopes of
' However, this over-regulation leads the
dispelling another financial crises. "77
economy to become static and makes growth difficult. 7' 8 On the opposite end of
the spectrum, governments may wish to under-regulate in times of economic
' Instead, under-regulation may
prosperity in hopes of inducing further growth. 79
Congress seeks more under80
As
disaster.
financial
another
end up causing

171
172
173

Id.
Id.
Joshua Aizenman, FinancialCrisis and the Paradox of Under- and Over-Regulation 5
2009),
15018,
No.
Paper
Working

Research,
Econ.
of
Bureau
(Nat'l
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15018.pdf.
175

Id.
Id. at 6.
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Id.

177

Id. at 5.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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regulation, there could
be a greater risk of the next financial disaster being larger
81
and more severe.'
Overall, this Section argues that Congress should not simply repeal
Dodd-Frank in its entirety but rather enact amendments to cure its deficiencies.
First, Congress should amend the Volcker Rule to encourage liquidity while
protecting community banks. This can be achieved by lowering the regulatory
burden placed on institutions, simplifying the definition of proprietary trading
under the Volker Rule, and, finally, exempting smaller financial institutions.
Next, this Section argues that the Bureau should remain independent but altered
to ensure accountability. To encourage accountability but remain independent,
the Bureau should be amended to implement a multi-member committee to
replace the current single director structure. Finally, this Section argues that the
Orderly Liquidation Authority should be maintained and promoted as it allows
regulators with experience to determine what is the best course of action for
failing financial institutions.
A.

The Volcker Rule Needs to be Altered to Encourage Liquidity and
ProtectCommunity Banks

The Volcker Rule has been met with opposition from many in
Congress.'8 2 Many claim that the rule reduces liquidity of the market, which
makes market making difficult.1 83 The declining share percentage of community
banks has also been disconcerting. 8 a Congress views this declining percentage
as direct proof that the Volcker Rule is having damaging effects due to the
considerable and tedious compliance burdens.8 5 However, many in Congress
seek to rid the Dodd-Frank Act of the Volcker Rule completely.' 8 6 First, I suggest
reducing the compliance burden of the Volcker Rule. Next, I suggest simplifying
the definition of proprietary trading. Finally, I encourage Congress to exempt
smaller financial institutions from the Volcker Rule.

Id.
182
See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
183
See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
184
See Lux & GREENE, supra note 64.
185
Id. at 3; see also Fixing What's Wrong with Dodd-Frank - And That's a Lot, INV.'s Bus.
DAILY (June 17, 2016), https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/fixing-whats-wrong-withdodd-frank-and-thats-a-lot/.
186
See Jim Puzzanghera, House Votes Along PartyLines to Repeal Key Dodd-FrankFinancial
Reforms, L. A. TIMEs (June 8, 2017, 2:25 PM), http://beta.latimes.com/business/la-fi-dodd-frankrepeal-20170608-story.html.
181
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1. Congress Should Reduce the Compliance Burden of the Volcker
Rule
The Volcker's Rule's current compliance burden is substantial. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") estimated that the Volcker
87
Rule would cost banks up to $4.3 billion to fall into compliance standards. ' The
current Financial Services Committee blames these88massive regulations because
"big banks are bigger and small banks are fewer."'
The National Bureau of Economic Research released a report shortly
after the economic recession of 2008.189 In the report, Mr. Aizenman discussed
19 0
the paradox of regulation depending on the state of the economy. The paper
supported the idea that higher effort, i.e. more regulation, in helping avert a crisis
today would lead the public to infer that the risk of participating in the market is
lower than the actual risk. '' This would then lend less support to regulations in
the future, which could lead to another crisis. 192
This appears to be the situation that happened after the Great Recession
of 2008. Immediately following the crisis, and with the election of Barack
Obama, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which was deemed the "most
ambitious overhaul of financial regulation in generations."' 93 Several years later,
when a new Congress was elected, efforts to repeal parts of the Dodd-Frank Act
took center stage. 194
Thus, Congress needs to define a reasonable balance in the regulations
used to oversee banks and financial centers without becoming burdensome on
these institutions. This over-and under-regulation can lead to a paradox that will
continue until Congress promulgates regulations that adopt a more median
approach.' 95 The Volcker Rule needs to lower the compliance burden and request

187

OCC Volcker Rule Will Cost Banks Up to 4.3 Billion, AM. BANKR. INST. (Mar. 21, 2014),

https://www.abi.org/newsroom/bankruptcy-headlines/occ-volcker-rule-will-cost-banks-up-to-4

3

-

billion.
188

The Failures of Dodd-Frank, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FIN. SERVS. [hereinafter Failures],

https://financialservices.house.gov/issueshome/issue/?IssueID=5
See Aizenman, supra note 173.
189
190

Id.

191

Id.
Id.

192

797 6

(last visited Oct. 10, 2018).

Brady Dennis, Obama Signs FinancialOverhaul Into Law, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010),
2
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 010/07/21/AR2010072100512.html.
193

See Failures, supra note 188; Kelsey Ramirez, Senate Banking Committee Introduces
2017),
5,
(Dec.
HOuSINGWIRE
Act,
Dodd-Frank
of
Repeal
194

https://www.housingwire.com/articles/4201 0-senate-banking-committee-introduces-repeal-ofdodd-frank-act.
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only the information necessary to help those who oversee the various
organizations to monitor them effectively.
2.

Congress Should Simplify the Definition of Proprietary Trading

The Volcker Rule includes a prohibition to prevent entities from
'
engaging in "proprietary trading."196
Currently, the Volcker Rule defines
proprietary trading as
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking
entity or nonbank financial company... in any transaction to
purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security,
any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future
delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or
contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the
appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission may... determine.19 7
This definition is seen by many to be overly broad and could hurt
liquidity in the markets. 9' 8 One of the key terms within the definition is the term
"trading account." The Final Rule provides functional definitions of "trading
account." The Rule provides for three separate tests for determining a trading
account: the "purpose test," "Market Risk Capital Rule test," or "status test."
The "purpose test" examines what the account is principally used for.
The test requires the examination of whether any of the accounts were principally
used for the purpose of selling in the near term.'9 9 This language is provided for
in the Bank Holding Company Act as it was amended by Dodd-Frank. 20 It is the
only of these three tests that is explicitly mentioned in the statutory text.
The "market risk capital rule test" requires accounts to be treated as
trading accounts if they are used to acquire, or take one or more; covered
financial positions, other than positions that are foreign exchange derivatives;
commodity derivatives, or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery
that are Market Risk Capital Rule covered positions; if the banking entity, or any
affiliate of the banking entity that is a bank holding company, calculates riskbased capital ratios under the Market Risk Capital Rule.2"' Basically, the Market

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2018)).
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Risk Capital Rule test ensures that any accounts that are used to purchase or sell
financial instruments (that are market risk capital rule covered positions and
trading positions) would fall under the definition of a trading account for
purposes of Dodd-Frank.
Lastly, the "status test" considers a transaction a trading account,
regardless of purpose, if the banking entity is licensed or registered to engage in
20 2
the business of a dealer, swap dealer, or security-based swap dealer. The test
also looks to whether the banking entity engages with dealers, swap dealers, or
2 3
security-based swap dealers outside of the United States. "
As many organizations have attempted to apply these tests to their own
accounts and transactions, they have found it very difficult to determine what
may constitute a trading account. Each entity has had differing views on the way
to correct these problems. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association, the American Bankers Association, the Financial Services
Roundtable, and the Clearing House Association submitted a comment letter in
20 4
In
regards to the proprietary trading provisions included in the Volcker Rule.
the letter, the entities hold the view that the only test that should be used in
determining what constitutes a trading account under the Volcker Rule is the
"purpose test."20 5 They argue that the other tests, the "Market Risk Capital Rule"
and "status," are beyond the authority that the statutory language has granted to
the rule-makers.20 6 The letter supports the idea that, instead of adding other tests
not included in the statutory language, the "purpose test" should only be applied
to accounts and transactions.20 7
Another view, submitted by the United States Department of the
Treasury ("Treasury") to President Donald Trump, holds the opposite view and
seeks to eliminate the "purpose test" in its entirety while keeping the other two
20 9
The report
tests. 20 8 The report states that the "purpose test" is too subjective.
tests
"status"
and
Rule"
Capital
Risk
encourages the application of the "Market
2 10
as these are more objective.
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Regardless of an individual's thoughts on which tests to apply, it appears
that the large complexity of factors makes it difficult for organizations to
determine what falls under the definition of proprietary trading. Thus, Congress
needs to designate an overarching test to allow organizations to determine
whether their activities fall under the definition of proprietary trading. The
uncertainty in determining whether this definition applies to their accounts and
transactions can cause the market to suffer.
3.

Congress Should Exempt Smaller Financial Institutions

Another option available to Congress to correct some of the
disagreements with the Volcker Rule is to exempt smaller institutions that do not
pose risks to financial stability or exempt firms engaged in little to no proprietary
trading as the substantial burden imposed by the rule outweighs the benefits in
monitoring these institutions.
Many members of Congress have pointed to the Dodd-Frank Act for the
declining market share of small banks within the United States."1 ' From 2006 to
2010, the market share of small banks was declining at a rate of about six
percent. 2 12 However, after the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the share of small
banks has been declining at a rate almost double that.21 3
In an effort to curb this sudden accelerated decline of smaller
institutions, exempting certain small and "community" banks would help stop
the decline while also maintaining a stable economy. A current Treasury report
lends support to the fact that regulators will likely pursue the option of
differentiating requirements for smaller institutions, 21 4' and, thus, easing the
burden on them. However, many argue that a full exemption would be more
beneficial for small institutions. 2 5 The opposite argument provides that a blanket
exemption for small banks under a certain asset amount would not solve anything
and could lead to another recession.21 6
It is important for Congress to give relief to these smaller institutions.
These "community" banks cannot handle the large compliance burden that the
211
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Volcker Rule imposes upon them. Therefore, an exemption for certain entities
would ease the burden on the small banks and would benefit regulators with less
oversight needed. Recently, the Treasury submitted a recommendation for
217
exempting banks with $10 billion or less in assets. While this appears to be a
reasonable starting point for easing the burden on smaller institutions, it is
unlikely to make its way through Congress. The recommendations from the
Treasury need to be limited in their exemption. By limiting the dollar amount for
the assets, the exemption will ensure the benefit will only go towards small
banking entities.
B.

The Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau Should Be Altered to
ProtectIts Independence and Stop Its Abuse of Power.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") should be altered
to retain its purpose when first created and reign in some of its overly broad
powers. As discussed above, the CFPB has been under scrutiny for its
questionable practices." 8 Many have pointed to the lack of accountability and
overly broad substantive authority as to why the CFPB has failed to be
effective.2" 9 I suggest that the CFPB should be headed by a multi-member board
to avoid accountability issues. I conclude by encouraging the retention of the
CFPB's authority to regulate industries.
1. The CFPB Should Be Held Accountable for Its Actions While
Maintaining a Level of Independence
The CFPB structure invests power in a single director that has the power
22 0
to enforce many federal consumer finance laws. This organizational structure
22
has encouraged many legal challenges against the Bureau. The idea of having
a single director with such an immense amount of authority concerns many.
Currently, the CFPB is undergoing changes and conflict under the new
Trump administration, after Richard Cordray, the CFPB's director since 2012,
appointed his deputy director, Leandra English, to the position upon his
departure.2 22 Following the decision of the courts to make the position "at-will,"

217
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Trump appointed his own director to the position, Mick Mulvaney. 223 A judge
ruled that he would maintain Trump's appointment to the position. 24
Originally, the CFPB was to be headed by a multi-member board. 2 5
However, reiterations in Congress altered the language to create the Bureau with
a single director at its head. 2 6 Reverting to a multi-member commission would
likely help with the concern over a lack of accountability. An organizational
structure similar to the SEC would likely help to ease worries created by the
current structure. 2 7 Members of the board could account for and provide for a
check on the various organizational activities. This structure would also ensure
the independence of the agency.
Many pursue the idea that the President's Article II powers allow him to
appoint and remove the head of the CFPB "at-will. '228 They maintain that it is
important for the President to be able to control and lead the Executive Branch. 29
While the power to control the Executive Branch is important and fundamental
to the Constitution, the importance of protecting American consumers' interests
from the political pressures of lobbyists and others is more important. Thus, to
maintain accountability and the independence of the CFPB, Congress should
amend the CFPB to include a multi-member board that is accountable to one
another. This would help to curb the problem in regard to investing all of the
power in one director.
2.

The CFPB's Authority Should Be Maintained to Ensure They Have
the Authority to Protect Individuals

Many have argued that the CFPB has overly broad authority granted to
it under the Dodd-Frank Act. These individuals point to the problems that have
occurred recently within the CFPB .23' They worry that even terms that are
already defined in statutory and case law seem to have no power to control the

226
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CFPB, as the CFPB may redefine terms mentioned in their statutory power as
provided in the Dodd-Frank Act.231
While this argument has merit, the current push to immensely limit the
CFPB's powers would have a detrimental effect on consumer protection. The
regulatory framework needs to be malleable so that the CFPB can effectively
regulate the ever-changing market and ensure consumers are protected. The issue
regarding the failure to follow precedents established by other financial
organizations is one that is pressing. These "agency-specific" precedents
challenge the fundamental canon of administrative law that principles developed
within this area of the law are applicable to all agencies and are not applied on
an agency-by-agency basis.2 3 2 The opponents of the CFPB point to the ability of
the Bureau to redefine some terms that have already been defined in other
administrative agencies. 23 3 This "silo" approach by the CFPB can lead to
disorganization and confusion when courts seek to apply definitions to
administrative law issues. Thus, while the CFPB's power to prosecute certain
activities should not be limited, the ability to redefine terms already defined can
create conflict between separate agencies.
Therefore, the broad authority granted to the CFPB should be maintained
so that the Bureau can effectively protect the interests of consumers. However,
canons of administrative law should be maintained, and precedents set within
one agency should be applicable to all. This follows canons of administrative law
that holds that precedents are universal regardless of the agency applying
them.234
C. The OrderlyLiquidationAuthority Should Be Maintainedand
Promoted.

Many have wondered whether the Orderly Liquidation Authority
("OLA") is necessary, and whether the goals of the OLA can be met in other
ways.2135 They argue that OLA creates another avenue from bankruptcy that is
unnecessary and tedious.23 6 Furthermore, they point to the legal issues facing
OLA that may prevent it from being used.237 Others have cited the OLA as a
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positive alternative
to regular bankruptcy proceedings for ensuring economic
23 8
stability.
The current OLA should be maintained from the Dodd-Frank Act. The
provision provides an important avenue for large financial firms to reorganize
and consolidate debts when their failure could lead to problems, as seen in 2008
with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and other large financial institutions.
Furthermore, the provision gives more power to government agencies to regulate
the fallout of economic institutions in danger of failing.
The reasons for maintaining the OLA are vast. This avenue is controlled
by the major regulators in the United States economic system, including the
FDIC, Federal Reserve, and others. 239 These agencies monitor and regulate the
various financial institutions that would likely need to use the provisions of the
OLA. Thus, the institutional knowledge that these agencies have will be
instrumental in understanding the proper course to follow in liquidating and
reorganizing.
Many argue that passage of OLA has reinforced the idea of "too-big-tofail" and that large firms would be able to rely on a bail out when they encounter
financial difficulty.240 Instead, they propose enhancements to the current
Bankruptcy Code. 241 The proposed enhancements mirror many provisions
available in the OLA. 242 However, these enhancements have suffered setbacks
as any bills to amend the Bankruptcy Code included provisions repealing Title
II's OLA entirely. 243 Others have put forth the idea that if the enhancements are
included in the Bankruptcy Code, Title II's OLA should remain within the
regulatory regime.
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The OLA should remain within the regulatory structure of the financial
system because it provides relief for important and large financial institutions
that are not available under regular bankruptcy law. First, OLA allows the FDIC
to take control of the financial firm quickly. 2 " This quick movement prevents
banking entities from moving away from failing financial finms and creating a
situation in which a financial firm that may have been viable then no longer
becomes viable. Second, OLA provides a source of immediate funding for these
firms so that they can maintain relationships with creditors and retain their
value.2 45 This funding may need to be attained quickly and in large amounts for
the financial institution to continue. The provisions of the OLA are important
because it provides for a pre-arranged financing arrangement so that these firms
can have immediate access once the Secretary has determined that the firm
qualifies. 24 6 Lastly, the OLA provides for a limited stay of close-out rights of
qualified financial contracts ("QFC"). 24 7 This important part of the OLA ensures
that if one entity within a large financial firm fails, the failure will not trigger a
large-scale termination of QFC's seeking to liquidate and seize the firm's
assets. 248 This power ensures that an uncertainty-driven craze does not remove
contracts important to preserve the firm's critical operations. Therefore, the OLA
should remain as an important part of the regulatory structure to ensure that large
financial institutions can liquidate and consolidate without fear of another
recession.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress and the government should maintain the provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act mentioned above. The Dodd-Frank Act provides important
regulatory structure to help thwart another Great Recession. While these
provisions are in no way perfect, they provide a framework that will be helpful
in developing future revisions. As this Note has discussed, several small changes
to the current Dodd-Frank Act would provide substantial benefits to the
economy.
Congress can begin by altering the Volcker Rule to encourage liquidity
and protect community banks. To accomplish this, Congress can reduce the
compliance burden of the Volcker Rule. Much of the information given to
regulators is not necessary for their oversight, so by reducing the information
given to regulators, Congress can help smaller institutions who cannot meet the
burdens provided in the Volcker Rule. Next, the definition of proprietary trading
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can be simplified to ensure firms understand what accounts and transactions fall
under the purview of the Rule. Lastly, an exemption for smaller financial
institutions would provide much needed relief for those who do not participate
in proprietary trading often, or are small enough not to affect economic stability.
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should be altered to strike a
balance between preventing abuses of powers and remaining a leader in
consumer protection. The CFPB can be reformed to remove the single director
and adopt the original idea of having a multi-member board. This will ensure a
level of accountability while the Bureau maintains its independence from
political influence. However, the CFPB's authority needs to be maintained to
ensure that the Bureau can shift with time to the ever-changing market.
The Orderly Liquidation Authority should remain as an alternative to
traditional bankruptcy. The OLA provides important provisions that traditional
bankruptcy does not and will allow for the quick and orderly liquidation of large
financial institutions. These provisions include the quick control attained by the
FDIC, immediate funding available to institutions, and a limited stay on qualified
financial contracts.
The Great Recession of 2008 not only affected some of the largest
financial institutions in the country, but it also shook the foundation of American
society. Millions of men and women became unemployed because the regulatory
structure in place failed them. Thus, it is important to introduce and maintain
new regimes of financial regulation to ensure that a large collapse does not
happen at the level of severity it did in 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act does several
things right and several things wrong. However, repealing the entirety of the Act
would only lead to more problems in financial markets. Thus, the Act should be
modified to fix problems that have been discovered. These modifications will
build upon one another and hopefully, by the end, will create a dependable
regulatory structure.
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